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ABSTRACT
Digital content created by picture recording devices is often stored internally on the source device,
on either embedded or removable media. Such storage media is typically limited in capacity and
meant primarily for interim storage of the most recent image files, and these devices are
frequently configured to delete older files as necessary to make room for new files. When
investigations involve such devices and media, it is sometimes these older deleted files that would
be of interest. It is an established fact that deleted file content may persist in part or in its
entirety after deletion, and identifying the nature of file fragments on digital media has been an
active research area for years. However, very little research has been conducted to understand
how and why deleted file content persists (or decays) on different media and under different
circumstances. The research reported here builds upon prior work establishing a methodology for
the study of deleted file decay generally, and the application of that methodology to the decay of
deleted files on traditional computing systems with spinning magnetic disks. In this current work,
we study the decay of deleted image files on a digital camera with removable SD card storage, and
we conduct preliminary experiments for direct SD card and USB storage. Our results indicate that
deleted file decay is affected by the size of both the deleted and overwriting files, overwrite
frequency, sector size, and cluster size. These results have implications for digital forensic
investigators seeking to recover and interpret file fragments.
Keywords: digital forensics;
persistence; deleted file decay
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1.

INTRODUCTION

The use and operation of digital devices creates
associated digital traces: files and data on
storage devices, data in volatile memory,
network traffic, Windows registry keys, CPU
register values, etc. These traces, in whole and
in part, are used by digital forensics
investigators to infer and reconstruct past
events, and are also harvested by criminal
actors to collect private information. The
persistence and decay of digital traces over
time varies based on the type of trace, the
storage or processing medium, and other
inadvertent or deliberate activity which may
damage or destroy the trace. While some
traces may remain intact over time, most
deleted or otherwise released content is altered,
destroyed, and disassociated over time due to
normal system operation and deliberate
obfuscation activity. The current state of
practice in digital forensics accepts that traces
and trace fragments may or may not be
available. Analysts are able to reason over the
traces that are available, and in specific cases
may attempt to explain the cause and
significance of trace presence or absence;
however, the state of the art has not
addressed, in a rigorous and generalizable
manner, the question of why trace or trace
fragments do or do not persist or decay.
Most digital traces, such as allocated files,
configuration settings, running processes, or
network traffic are designed to persist while
they are allocated or in use; however, once deallocated, no longer active, or passed to
another process, these traces are subject to
decay, modification, and destruction. For
example, a file is stored on a magnetic hard
disk or solid-state media in groups of sectors
called clusters. A sector is the smallest unit
that a block device can read or write in a
single operation, and a cluster is the smallest
unit that a file system can allocate or deallocate. Clusters are often multi-sector and
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aligned, but not necessarily. When a file is
deleted , the file system marks the clusters
storing the data as available for future use as
needed, but does not typically alter any of the
original file data in those clusters. The
operating system and its file system may
eventually overwrite some or all of the media
sectors used to store the original file. As a
result some or all of the deleted file will be
'
destroyed, while other parts may remain intact
for an indefinite period of time. Tools exist to
"undelete" files when the data remains intact,
file carving techniques (Ravi et al, 2016) (Yi et
al, 2015) (Garfinkel, 2007) can recover full or
partial files after deletion, and forensic
investigators regularly recover full and partial
traces from media. While solid state hard disks
(SSDs) and thumb drives may use the same
file systems as magnetic hard disks, the
underlying operation of these devices is
significantly different. The flash memory of
SSDs and thumb drives has an additional
processing layer, called the Flash Translation
Layer (FTL) , which is designed to optimize the
reliability, performance, and lifetime of the
device. FTL implementations are generally not
published and vary across vendors and device
types, although recent work reverse engineers
the firmware of flash implementations to
reconstruct data (Zhang, 2015). The FTL and
associated device logic implement wear leveling
(writing to all locations an even number of
times) , TRIM (preemptively erasing storage
locations so they are ready for a subsequent
write), and proactively rearrange the data
within the storage device. As a result, deleted
file persistence on magnetic and flash devices is
significantly
different ,
although
TRIM
implementations
are quite
fragile
and
frequently do not work as designed (Gubanovis
& Afonin, 2014), leaving more data available
for recovery than expected.
To help visualize deleted file decay and
partial trace recovery, a deleted BMP image
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file was repeatedly rendered as sectors of the
original file were overwritten. This sequence of
images is shown in Figure 1, where 100% of
the sectors are intact on the left, and sectors
are overwritten going from left to right until
only 15% of the original sectors remain intact
for the rightmost image. The BMP image
format is most suitable for such recovery, as
file contents map directly to the image layout,
although other work (Sencar & Memon, 2009)
(Uzun & Sencar, 2015) has shown that partial
image recovery from other image formats is

CDFSL Proceedings 2017
possible as well. For arbitrary file types, work
by Garfinkel and McCarrin (2015) investigates
the probative potential of file fragments. The
work presented here helps to understand the
factors affecting deleted file decay on flash
media, and is relevant to digital forensic
investigations as practitioners extend their
capabilities beyond whole file recovery and into
partial file recovery and interpretation.

Figure 1. Rendering deleted BMP file as it decays

2.

RELATED WORK

Fairbanks and Garfinkel (2012) posited factors
which might affect the persistence of deleted
file content. This paper is predated by other
work observing the effects of data persistence
but not attempting to explain it beyond the
immediate case. In chapter 7 of their 2005
book "Forensic Discovery," Farmer and
Venema (2005) published experimental data
and partial explanations for the persistence of
deleted file information. While useful, the
experiments were limited in scope, and the
discussion sought to explain the observed
persistence given aspects of their particular
test system rather than computer systems in
general. As noted by Venema elsewhere (Reust
& Fried burg, 2006) , " ... persistence of deleted
file content is dependent on file system,
activity, and amount of free space (a complex
relationship)." Roussev and Quates (2012)
tangentially show the effects of data
persistence in a case study of the M57 dataset.
The case study focused on content triage using
similarity digests, but the paper includes a
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graph of deleted file data persistence for a
specific example (see Figure 1 on page S66 of
that publication). The decay effect, observed
as an almost linear reduction in deleted file
content over a matter of days, is explained by
the user deleting the files and continuing to
use the system normally. Had the user in this
case employed a well-implemented secure
deletion tool, as discussed in (Joukov et al,
2006) and elsewhere, the original file data
locations would have been overwritten and
rendered irrecoverable immediately upon
deletion. Such tools typically do not address
the possibility of data remnants in locations
other than the primary storage clusters,
meaning that remnant recovery is possible
even in the face of secure deletion.
An
example of this is when a new copy of a file is
made during the modification process and the
original version is then deleted. Although the
new version will be securely erased, the
persistence of the clusters that constituted the
original version is unknown. This can also
happen in the absence of file modification due
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to drive defragmentation. The challenge in
such cases, and m any experiment or
investigation without ground truth, is how to
establish that a remnant is part of a specific
original file vs. a false positive, a situation
which is discussed in (Garfinkel et al, 2010).
The work proposed here will track the sectors
of a deleted file in place, although integrating
this with other work finding and reasoning
over deleted file fragments found in any
location is a logical next step and will lead to a
more complete model of deleted file
persistence.
Factors affecting deleted file persistence
noted by Fairbanks and Garfinkel include
device types, especially the difference between
magnetic and flash storage. Bell and
Boddington (2010) wrote one of the first
complete analyses of this effect for solid state
drives. Later work, including (Casey &
Turnbull, 2011) (Huang et al, 2015) , discussed
the impact of flash memory for digital forensics
in the context of mobile devices and the
recovery of fragmented files. Fairbanks and
Garfinkel also suggest that file type may affect
deleted file persistence, suggesting email
databases as an example. As early as 2007,
(Stahlberg et al, 2007) and (Litchfield, 2007)
discussed deleted data persistence in databases
and how this differs from normal file deletion.
More recently, Conrad et al (2009) discussed
deleted data persistence in the context of
forensic analysis of a Sony PlayStation
Portable.
The
rapid
rise
in
cloud
infrastructure, especially multi-tenant clouds,
has generated interest m deleted data
persistence in such environments where
multiple entities share a common underlying
infrastructure. Govan (2013) presents a
detailed analysis of data remanence for several
applications, and concludes that the effects are
conflicting: deleted data may be replicated in
multiple locations and so will be more
recoverable, while the frequent writing of data
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and lack of transparency will inevitably modify
or destroy deleted file traces or at least call
into question their integrity.
The work presented here is related to, but
distinct from, efforts to identify the filetypes of
recovered file fragments, work that has been
ongoing for over 10 years (Li et al, 2006)
(Calhoun & Coles, 2008) (Roussev & Quates,
2013). These efforts are aimed at identifying
the type of file from which a fragment
originated, whereas we are studying the factors
affecting the decay of the original file into the
fragments that are eventually recovered.
Similarly, our work supports the development
of deterministic approaches in digital forensics
(Nagy et al, 2015), but is not itself a
deterministic reasoning approach.
While
considerable effort has been spent to process
full and partial digital traces, little work has
been
directed
at
understanding
the
mechanisms driving the decay of full traces
into partial traces.

3. APPROACH AND

lVlETHODOLOGY
We developed and implemented a methodology
to track the decay of deleted file contents over
time. We first capture multiple sequential
images of a device's stored data, where files to
be tracked are deleted between the first two
images (images O and 1). Files known to the
file system in image O but not in image 1 are
the deleted files. Once identified, we use image
0 to record the sector locations and original
contents of those files (sectors) prior to
deletion. We then track the contents of the
original file's sectors over the remaining
images, identifying if, when, and which sectors
of each deleted file were changed. This
approach is based on the differential analysis
ideas articulated by Garfinkel et al (2012). The
file and sector change data is then processed to
form and test hypotheses as to which factors
affect deleted file decay, and to design
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additional experiments. This process is
summarized in Figure 2 and detailed m the

text that follows.
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Step 4: record contents of origina l
file locations at each snapshot

Step 5: analyze recorded data to establish persistence
of each de leted artifact, in whole and in part

Step 1: Record sequential images of the raw
hard disk contents for a single system over
time. Files may be created prior to the first
image at tO, but the first image must include
the files to be deleted and tracked as allocated
files, and the files to track must be deleted
between image O and image 1.
Step 2: Determine which files were deleted by
comparing the allocated files in image 1 and
image O; files allocated in image O and not in
image 1 are considered deleted. Deleted file
information includes file name, file size, and
the sectors allocated to the file in image 0.
Step 3: Record a cryptographic hash of the
contents of the data sectors in image O (before
deletion) for each deleted file.
Step 4 : Record a hash of the contents of those
same sectors for all other images (image 1 to
image N).
Step 5: Use the stored data to analyze deleted
file decay, i.e. , when did the contents (sectors)
of each file change and why.

We use a publicly available Python
implementation of this methodology developed
by
Jones
and
Khan
(201 7).
The
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3

implementation assumes a series of disk images
in raw format and a filesystem supported by
The Sleuth Kit 1 (fiwalk). The implementation
comes in two parts. The first program,
adiff.py, processes the raw images and
populates a sqlite3 database with sector hashes
for

each deleted file and image.

The second

program, trace_ file. py, processes the sqlite3
database from adiff.py and produces one or
more output items: data, graphs, and console
displays representing deleted file decay.
For these experiments, we used FTK
Imager and the *nix dd command to collect
device and media raw images. Each device was
prepared prior to any file activity according to
the test design. Depending on the experiment,
preparation included erasing old data,
reformatting the device, wiping the data on the
device, and/ or configuring sector and cluster
sizes. Files were then written to the media and
a raw image of the media contents was
recorded (image 0). Files were then deleted
according to the specific experiment, where
deletion may have been initiated by direct user
action or by the system as a result of user
1 http: //www.sleuthkit.org/ sleuthkit / desc.php
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action (such as letting the media fill up and
continue to write new files). Another raw
image of the media contents was recorded after
file deletion (image 1). Additional activity was
then executed per the experiment design, and
raw images of the media content were taken at
designed intervals (images 2, 3, ... ). The raw
images were then processed using the
implementation noted above to produce decay
curves and raw decay data for each file. A
sample decay curve for several files is shown in
Figure 3, where the x-axis represents
sequential media image identifiers, and the yaxis represents the % of the original file that
remains intact at each image. Images are not
necessarily taken at regular intervals, so the xaxis should be interpreted as representing
experiment-specific activity and not equal time
intervals. The % intact value is a fraction of
the original file's sectors that remain
unchanged. Raw output data consists of the
per-file decay data as rows of comma-separated
values, suitable for additional processing. The
per-experiment sqlite database was also
retained, allowing for additional queries and
subsequent analysis based on characteristics
such as file size, file type, file name and path,
etc.

--~--=-,

0~o

4.

RESULTS

We conducted two sets of experiments using
the methodology described above. The first set
of experiments used a security camera with SD
card storage, and the second set of experiments
used SD cards and USB sticks mounted on a
Windows workstation.

4.1 Camera Experiment Results
A FosCam security camera was configured
with 4 GB SD card storage, pointed out of a
window, and pictures were taken automatically
every few seconds until the media filled at
'
which point a raw image of the SD card
storage was taken. The camera continued to
take pictures, and by design began deleting
and overwriting the original picture files.
Images of the SD card media were taken at
regular intervals as the device continued to
take new pictures and the contents of the
original
picture
files
were
repeatedly
overwritten. A total of 4401 files were written
over the original files. Figure 4 shows the new
(overwriting) file sizes over time. Files are
named and stored sequentially, so are ordered
chronologically by name. Larger files were
created as light and activity filled the camera's
field of view in the morning, which occurred
about 1/ 3 of the way into the graph.

.....,._---J~

- - - ! :3~ - ~ 4_ _

"""'0~ ID C< "'tui!!n<iOI)

Figure 3. Sample Deleted File Decay Curves
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Image Size over capture Time
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4.

File size over time for overwriting camera files

Figure 5 shows individual deleted file
persistence based on the order in which the file
was originally written. These are the 157 files
that were overwritten by the 4401 files in
Figure 4. Note that the scales of Figure 4 and
Figure 5 are not aligned; the files that were
overwritten
and
tracked
were
stored
sequentially on the media, and the overwriting
files were stored sequentially as well, but we
overwrote the original files multiple times. It is
true that File 1 in both figures started at the
same offset on the media, but varying file sizes
means they don't necessarily end at the same
offset. Consequently, File 2 in both graphs
does not necessarily start or end at the same
offset, etc. The percent persistence value (yaxis of Figure 5) is the final persistence of each
file after multiple overwrites. The oscillating
pattern (periodically ranging from -0% to
- 50%) over sequential images may be
explained by variation in the size of the
overwriting files and the cluster size storing the
deleted files. We used a cluster size of 32 kB
(64 512-byte sectors), and the overwriting files
oscillated around a cluster boundary (128
sectors, or two clusters). Overwriting files
slightly smaller than two clusters would
overwrite almost all of the data in the second
and final cluster, whereas overwriting files
slightly larger than two clusters would
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overwrite very little of the data in the third
and final cluster.
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File Persistence over capture time
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Figure 5. Persistence over time for deleted camera files

Figure 6 shows the distribution of deleted
file persistence after one round of overwriting.
Each line in the graph represents the
persistence of one file , prior to deletion on the
left-side y-axis and after the first overwrite on
the right-side y-axis. At this early point, after
one overwrite, the persistence of the deleted
files ranges from -0-50% with some files
persisting at 100% (the values on the right-side
y-axis). As the overwriting continued using
different file sizes and multiple overwrites
(about 25 in total), the distribution of deleted
file persistence coalesced around 0% or 50%,
with none of the values in between (as
indicated in Figure 5) . It appears that the
relationship between original (deleted) file
sizes, overwriting file sizes, and cluster sizes
may explain this phenomenon, although we
have yet to fully explore this.
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File persistence distribution

after one

Figure 7 shows the relationship between
file size and persistence for these same deleted
files , also after only one overwrite. In the
graph, data points are color-coded by clusters
used: 2 cluster files are orange and use less
than 128 sectors (x-axis), 3 cluster files are
green and red and use from 128 to 192 sectors,
and 4 cluster files are blue and use 192 to 256
sectors. The 3 cluster range (the x-axis from
128 sectors or 2 clusters to 192 sectors or 3
clusters) is further broken out to highlight a
linear persistence pattern for some of these files
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(the upward-sloping trend of > 0% persistence
between 140 sectors and 192 sectors; red points
if viewing m color). Several interesting
patterns are apparent (see the circled
annotations on Figure 7): (i) the linear trend
just noted from 140 sectors to 192 sectors,
followed by a declining curve above 192
sectors, (ii) the narrowing shape from 110
sectors to 128 sectors, leading to the

concentrated flatline from 128 sectors to 155
sectors, (iii) the pattern of 0% and 100% which
changes as the sector value changes, and (iv)
the two non-zero clusters for files over 192
sectors. We are continuing to analyze this data
and these patterns, and are continuing
additional experiments, in order to explain
these observations.

Foscam Automatically Deleted File Persistence

®

0

IO

• • • •

:l,Pcm;ID,;:.& •

120

100

@

140

160

®
•

80

200

220

Number of Sectors
•

aus er files

3 Ouster fr es

2 Cius er Files

• 3 Cluster Trendline

Figure 7: Final persistence vs. file size (number of sectors) for camera overwriting experiments

4.2 SDCardandUSB
Experiment Results
A separate set of experiments was conducted
to determine the effect of cluster size on
deleted
file
persistence
when
multiple
overwrites are performed. A common set of
files of varying sizes was written to an SD
card, once with 32-kB cluster size and once
with 64-kB cluster size. For each configuration,
the media was imaged (image 0), the files were
deleted (image 1), and new files were
repeatedly written to the media until full
(images 2-6). Decay curves for the deleted files
are shown in Figure 8. With a 64-kB cluster
size, more deleted files have higher persistence
after multiple overwrites. By comparison, a 32kB cluster size yielded some deleted files of
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very high persistence after 1-3 overwrites, but
these files did not persist to the same degree as
the 64-kB cluster size after subsequent
overwrites. Average persistence across all files
for each cluster size was modeled as
exponential decay depending on time running,
file size, media size, and new image rate
(Figure 9).
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De leted File Sector Persistence: All Files

Deleted Fi le Sector Persistence: All Files
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Figure 8. SD card file decay (cluster size 32 kB left and 64 kB right)

Persistance vs Number of Overwrites
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Figure 9. SD card deleted file persistence based on
cluster size and multiple overwrites

Finally, preliminary experiments were run to
explore the combined effect of file system,
media, and cluster size on deleted file
persistence. No effect was observed for
different file systems (F AT32 vs. NTFS) , but
an effect was observed when the media type
was USB and cluster size was varied (512
bytes, 4096 bytes , and 8192 bytes). See Figure
10 for associated decay curves. Additional
experiments to explore this effect are
underway.
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Figure 10. Effect of media and cluster size on deleted
file persistence

5.

CONCLUSIONS AND
FUTURE-WORK

We present results from multiple experiments
exploring the factors affecting deleted file
persistence on digital cameras with SD card
storage, direct SD card storage, and USB
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memory sticks. Our results suggest that
influential factors include file sizes of deleted
and overwriting files, cluster size especially as
it relates to file sizes, media type, and number
of overwrites. It is generally accepted that
under
common
conditions
of
limited
overwrites, it is likely that some file fragments
may remain indefinitely in the cluster slack
space of newly allocated files. A related and
possibly non-intuitive result here is that
fragments of some files will remain even under
conditions of repeated overwrites, as indicated
by the exponential decay of Figure 9.
Our conclusions generally match our
intuition and the hypotheses posed by others;
however, no prior empirical work exists to
which our conclusions can be compared. It is
our hope and expectation that others will use
the tools and methods described here to
conduct additional experiments to validate or
refute these preliminary results. Our future
work will continue to explore the open
questions posed by this work. We will also
explore additional factors that might affect
deleted file persistence on these and other
storage devices and systems. Related work
currently in progress is exploring deleted file
persistence on mobile phones, IoT devices, and
industrial control systems equipment.
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